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Iconicity in Cognition  
and Communication 
Christina Ljungberg ∗ 
Abstract: »Ikonizität in Kognition und Kommunikation«. Iconicity is fundamen-
tal to creative processes of reasoning such as modelling. We use models not on-
ly to orient ourselves in the physical world surrounding us but also as ways to 
sketch out problems by “mapping them,” describe processes, or make decisions 
by using models such as diagrams, maps, or schemata. Mental images are icons, 
and icons can lead to new and rare insights and to the discovery of relations 
that would not be recognized without their iconic representation. Discussing 
the relationship between modelling, reasoning, and creativity, this contribution 
argues that iconicity is essential to reasoning, communication and mutual un-
derstanding, besides being inherently performative. The paper demonstrates its 
argument with examples from picture viewing, map reading, and mental dia-
grams in verbal language. 
Keywords: Iconicity, diagrammatic reasoning, modelling, analogy, similarity, 
visuality, performativity. 
1.   Introduction 
Thinking involves experimentation, trying out various possibilities. Besides 
other cognitive instruments such as words, images and other signs, a model is 
one of the heuristic devices that we deploy in such experimental contexts in 
order to probe and explore new fields of thoughts and ideas. Models are inter-
nal (mental) or external diagrammatic representations. This is why iconicity – 
the general characteristic of mental images – is essential to cognitive pro-
cessing; it builds on perceptual similarities and contrasts. We depend on mod-
els, not only for orienting ourselves in our physical environment but also for 
the ways in which we sketch out problems by “mapping them,” describe our 
experiences or make decisions by means of diagrams, maps, and schemata. 
Iconicity is fundamental to constructing models because mental images are 
icons, and interpreting icons can lead to the discovery of relations not other-
wise recognized so that new and even surprising insights may be obtained. 
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2. Iconicity 
Iconicity is a semiotic concept introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce, the 
founder of modern semiotics. Peirce divides signs into three classes, iconic, 
indexical and symbolic, with respect to the way each sign relates to its (dynam-
ic) object. Indices stand in a real or causal relation to the object they indicate; 
symbols are related to their object by habits or conventions, while icons are, 
roughly, associated with their objects by being, in some way or other, similar to 
them. This similarity can be a visual likeness in the sense that the sign resem-
bles the form or colour of its object, but it may also be of an abstract kind, in 
the sense that it merely represents its structure, in which case the icon is a dia-
gram. A diagram may have the form of external representation, on paper or as a 
three-dimensional model, or it may be a mental image of the object it repre-
sents. In the sense that interpreting and understanding a sentence, for example, 
or any other kind of information, means understanding how its constituent parts 
are related, understanding means creating a mental diagram (see Nöth 2015). 
2.1  Iconicity and Analogy 
Analogy, as Aristotle defines it, “is when the second term is to the first as the 
fourth to the third [and] we may then use the fourth for the second, or the sec-
ond for the fourth” (Poetics 21). In the study of iconicity, analogy comes into 
play when we go one step further and subdivide the icon into its three Peircean 
subclasses of images, diagrams and metaphors. Whereas icons of the image 
type resemble their objects by some distinguishing features, and diagrams 
represent the mere structure of their object, a metaphorical icon is a sign that 
evinces a relation of similarity to some other sign, which is mediated by a third 
(the classical tertium comparationis). Metaphors are thus iconic mediators 
between ideas. As Mark Johnson (1981, 42) points out, “all theories are elabo-
rations of basic metaphors or systems of metaphors”. As far as metaphorical 
models are concerned, the focus is on diagrammatic iconicity. Both scientific 
and technological models as well as creative thought processes are essentially 
diagrams. Any analogy is a diagrammatic icon since it represents a parallelism 
between the structures of two conceptual domains – forming a structure that 
makes the relations between diverse objects, external or internal, more intelli-
gible. 
Take, for instance, a map. For a geographical map to fulfil its function, there 
must exist a “structural analogical relationship of the scaled topographic map to 
reality” (Woodward 2001, 56). A map represents points in space that are dia-
grammatically arranged by means of map signs. Even though map signs are 
culturally constructed, the structural similarity of a map to its territory is a 
concept that, as Woodward argues, is “fairly readily understood” (2001, 56). 
This is what enables the map maker as well as the map reader to visualize a 
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region or a route, project its development or implementation, or to make 
thought experiments by modelling a plan of action. It is this diagrammatic 
modelling that links cartography so closely to the nature of human cognition 
and to our orientation in real space. Models such as maps are ideal instruments 
for orientation, since they possess the unique facility to permit us both to “en-
ter” the map, position ourselves on it and within it as well as above it, allowing 
us to visualize our position inside it as well as the “full picture” from above. 
This is why the diagrammatic icon is our main interest in this paper. Diagram-
matic iconicity is the prototypical characteristic of reasoning since reasoning is 
to arrange ideas diagrammatically. 
3. The Relation between Modelling and Reasoning 
“Diagrammatic reasoning”, as Peirce (CP 2.272) calls it, is the only cognitive 
procedure by which we can obtain new knowledge. A diagram only shows the 
relations existing between its constituents; it does not interpret them. Interpret-
ing is reasoning, and in the process of interpreting the relations presented by a 
diagram, its interpreters can make diverse inferences by which they may obtain 
insights that the diagram itself does not convey. This is why observing a dia-
gram can create new knowledge. 
3.1  The Creative Process of Picture Viewing 
To illustrate this I would like to have a look at a picture such as Pietro Perugi-
no’s Christ Delivering the Keys of the Kingdom to St. Peter (ca. 1481-2, Figure 
1), which is, strictly speaking, a diagram employing the main elements of the 
central perspective – horizon line, vanishing point and orthogonal lines. Since 
the actors in the foreground, being centrally and symmetrically placed, attract 
our immediate attention, this is where we start. What we see up front is an 
event, carried out by the two actors in the center, one standing and one kneel-
ing, with a large key in profile connected to a second key held by the figure to 
the left, who is in the process of handing it over to the kneeling figure on the 
right. We can tell that these two actors are the most important ones because of 
their position in the painting and that the significance of the gesture of rever-
ence is shown by the surrounding group of people. Because the audience are all 
so closely observing what is going on, this effectively draws our attention to 
the center, too. Further back, behind the front actors, we discern some smaller 
characters, who look as if they were standing on top of the front actors’ heads. 
We also see an open square with lines that converge on the doorway of the 
temple in the background, making clear that this is the door for which the keys 
they carry will fit. 
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How do we process this picture? By using “diagrammatic reasoning”, we 
employ the picture as a diagram of perspective and mentally calculate the dis-
tances between the various objects that it represents, and thus we draw our 
conclusion on how the objects are related in their topographic and social space. 
First focusing on the two figures up front, the bright open space between them 
has us move our gaze towards the horizon line guided by the diagonal line 
behind the head of Christ, then connecting them with the temple door, which is 
diagrammatically positioned where the projections intersect at the picture’s 
vanishing point. Viewing the picture thus means that we, in a process of exper-
iment and discovery, can gain new information from the picture sign by ma-
nipulating its parts according to certain rules – and in so doing, acquire infor-
mation about how the objects making up the diagram are interrelated. From 
there, we infer what the scenario means. 
Figure 1: Pietro Perugino, Christ Delivering the Keys of the Kingdom to Saint 
Peter (ca. 1481-82). Fresco. Rome (Vatican), Sistine Chapel  
 
Public Domain: Wikimedia commons. 
 
One could well object that the event the painting represents is a well-known 
Biblical narrative that legitimates the Christian Church and that diagrammatic 
reasoning is therefore unnecessary. Does the image not simply depict what the 
title states? It is true that the title is necessary to indicate the names of the two 
protagonists in the center, but otherwise a viewer familiar with the cultural 
background in general can come to an understanding of the painting’s meaning 
by using diagrammatic reasoning alone. Even ignoring the main event por-
trayed in the painting, the diagram it forms make viewers understand that the 
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act depicted is of major importance. While keeping in mind that Perugino’s use 
of the then newly invented Renaissance convention of perspective is unique to 
Western art and may therefore not have the same impact on a non-Western 
viewer, the suggested relationship between the gesture, the key and the temple 
door would incite as well as aid most viewers to solve the riddle of its meaning. 
3.2  The Performativity of Diagrams 
This example shows why the convention of the central perspective has been 
enormously successful in the history of painting. Centering everything on the 
eye of the beholder, it functions, in the words of John Berger, “like a beam 
from a lighthouse” since “[p]erspective makes the single eye the center of the 
visual world” (Berger 1968, 16). By this device, the painting becomes a dia-
gram, instigating diagrammatic thinking, and since this process is less about the 
concrete shapes and forms of the figuration represented than about the dynam-
ics, it opens up the potential relationships it depicts. This points to the per-
formativity of diagrams: by inciting diagrammatic reasoning, which is less 
about structure than about manipulation and experimentation, thus trying out 
prospective alternatives, it produces new information and insight and, in so 
doing, creates new knowledge.1 
Diagrammatic reasoning also functions when we try to understand paintings 
with less explicit diagrammatic structure and symbolic content than in Perugi-
no’s painting. Even contemplating a picture such as Malevich’s Suprematist 
Composition: White on White (1918, Figure 2), one of the best-known exam-
ples of twentieth century avant-garde Russian art, helps us consider various 
alternatives and come to an interpretation. Malevich’s picture has often been 
given a mythologizing reading involving a quasi-mystical experience (Faerna 
1996). While its negation of figuration and pictorial composition has been 
interpreted as a “leap into a mystical beyond, inner as well as outer” (West 
2017, 92), which enables the viewer “to penetrate the universe through our 
imagination” (Hultén 1965), diagrammatic reasoning reveals intriguing materi-
al and phenomenological conditions seldom taken into account. 
                                                             
1  For an interesting analysis of Perugino’s painting from a different perspective, see Michael 
Marrinan’s essay ‘On the Thing-ness of Diagrams’ (2016, 28-9). 
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Figure 2: Suprematist Composition: White on White. Kasimir Malevich (1918).  
 
Public Domain: Wikimedia commons. 
 
Despite its title, the painting is not monochromatic, especially if we compare it 
to Yves Klein’s IKB 79 (1959).2 In contrast to Klein’s blue, one of nearly two 
hundred monochromatic blues, in Malevich’s painting white is not just white 
but a bluish square with imprecise outlines placed asymmetrically on a beige 
background. This does not only put colour designation into question but since 
figure and background are only distinguished by a minimal difference, the 
viewer gets the impression of seeing the figure placed on top of the back-
ground. However, as Frederik Stjernfelt (2007, 288) has pointed out, the square 
could even function as an ambiguous pattern, a Kippfigur shifting between 
object and background so that the object changes from being an object in the 
foreground and instead becomes a hole in the background, opening towards 
something else – or a void? Even though the difference between the two sur-
faces is minimal, one could also imagine that the square could refer to a zone of 
gravitation, which makes the square’s oblique position one of instability, 
threatening to disappear into the background. It is precisely this diagrammatic 
relationship between figure and ground that gives the painting its compositional 
                                                             
2  The comparison between Malevich’s White on White (1918) and Klein’s monochromatic blue 
IKB 79 (1959) also clearly demonstrates the difference between a diagram and an icon of 
the image type. Whereas Malevich wanted his art to express “the supremacy of pure feeling 
or perception” (MOMA 1999, 85), which would seem to correspond to an image icon, it is 
Klein’s holistic aesthetic which actually achieves this. As Klein writes, “Art does not depend 
on vision but on the sensibility that affects us, on affectivity therefore, and on that much 
more than all that touches our five senses” (Klein 1958, quoted in Stich 1994, 85). 
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tension and invites experimenting and acquiring or drawing further conclusions 
through diagrammatic reasoning.  
4. Modelling and Creativity 
Material models are mental diagrams before they become external signs. They 
also live on as mental diagrams in the minds of those who interpret them. Ma-
terial models such as maps are telling instances of how we operate on models 
to try out various possibilities, make decisions and, in so doing, find new solu-
tions and create new knowledge. 
4.1  Creative Solutions 
Figuring out one’s travel route on the London Underground Tube map (Figure 
3) is an instructive example of how we operate creatively on a diagram. The 
map only shows the relationships between the various stations, without specify-
ing the best connections between the point of departure A and a goal B. By 
experimenting on the various possibilities of finding the most advantageous 
route from A to B, including line changes, we are capable of modelling an 
itinerary that suits our purpose. The map per se does not mark the specific 
route we are taking. It is only by mentally manipulating the alternative routes 
offered by the map that we can obtain this information, that is, that we as users 
are able to trace new alternatives of new routes from the map. We may choose 
to change at different stations, or use a different combination of lines to avoid 
changing more than once – although the diagram does not directly indicate how 
to find the quickest and most efficient route. 
A comparison between Harry Beck’s famous map of 1933 and the first Lon-
don Underground map of 1908 (Figure 4) shows how innovative Beck’s map 
was. The London Metropolitan Railway – which was the world’s first under-
ground train line – had opened in January 1863 but, operated by several railway 
companies, developed so rapidly that it left passengers completely confused 
about how to find the easiest way to go from A to B. In 1908, finally, railway 
company operators united and pooled their resources to create a joint adver-
tisement in the form of a free publicity map (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3:  Harry Beck’s original London Underground Map (1933), Transport for 
London 
 
Source: <https://tfl.gov.uk/maps/>. 
Figure 4: The First London Underground Map (1908) 
 
Source: By Unknown, <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/clive.billson/tubemaps/1908.html>,  
Public Domain, <https://commons.wikimedia.org>. 
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However, the amount of information collected on the 1908 map proved too 
complex for many travelers. Displaying the lines of the eight various railway 
companies, labeled and colour-coded, the relative positions of their stations 
along the lines, the station’s connective relations with each other and the vari-
ous fare zones, the map of the sprawling Tube network was quite a challenge 
for Londoners and even more so for visitors unfamiliar with both the locations 
and the system. In addition, the additional information of important destina-
tions such as hospitals, main theatres, hotels and cemeteries included on the 
map cluttered it and made it difficult for its users to read and orient themselves 
efficiently. 
What makes Beck’s map so revolutionary is thus the diagrammatic reduc-
tion of a complex set of information into an operational network.3 By abandon-
ing geographical detail entirely and simplifying the complex structure by geo-
metrically straightening the lines to have the stations appear vertically, 
horizontally, or at 45 degree diagonals, Beck managed to represent the London 
Underground as a circuit diagram. First rejected by the publicity department on 
grounds that his design was too radical, the map was however granted a trial 
print run, which met with overwhelming success – this was exactly what the 
public wanted. That it became a template for transport systems worldwide and 
still is in operation after almost 85 years testifies to its merit. 
4.2  Architectural Models 
Similarly, in architecture, the strength of an architectural model or blueprint of 
a building is that while it represents the overall framework of a construction, its 
various interrelated parts can be changed, moved or discarded, allowing for an 
entirely new structure to be created that may not have been intended from the 
start. It abstracts from the concrete kinds of material in which it will be con-
structed, which is one of the key features of diagrams since this allows “the 
mind more easily to think of the important features” (Peirce 1998, 13). Never-
theless, as useful and productive as this kind of modelling are to those who are 
used to thinking visually, architectural drawings, like maps, need some practice 
to be mentally visualized and to convert the orthogonal plan into a mental 
diagram of a finished building. That is why architectural renderings, virtual 
two-dimensional images or animations showing the attributes of a proposed 
project, have become an indispensable tool for explaining to customers and 
politicians what the finished construction will look like. 
                                                             
3  As Kenneth Fields and William Cartwright (2014, 349) point out, Beck was most likely influ-
enced by many maps, but he “pushed the boundaries and created something different, in-
novative and experimental”, which, I would argue, proves the strength of Beck’s diagram-
matic reasoning and subsequent reduction. 
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4.3  Mental Diagrams and Verbal Language 
Mental diagrams are also at work in verbal language. We think in words, imag-
es and other signs arranged in mental diagrams – mental models – so that our 
thoughts can arrange and rearrange the diagram in mental experiments while 
probing and exploring new possibilities. Although words are symbols, they also 
evince iconic and indexical properties – otherwise they would be too abstract to 
represent anything. Iconicity, especially diagrammatic iconicity, plays a crucial 
part here. Syntactic deep structures are diagrams of what the sentences mean, 
and there is also iconicity in the sequential order of the words of our utterances. 
In the classical example, Caesar’s veni, vidi, vici, the shortness of the words is 
an icon of the short time in which Caesar conquered his opponents. Further-
more, as Winfried Nöth (2015, 23) points out, the order of the words is a dia-
gram of the order of the events during that battle. Diagrammatic iconicity can 
be found at all levels of language use: at the level of sentences, phrases and 
words. Verbs, for example, involve mental diagrams of the agents involved in 
the action they represent. 
Mental diagrams are systems and structures, and to the degree that language 
is a system that imposes structures on utterances and texts, verbal thought thus 
has diagrammatic form. Furthermore, a word is also a mental diagram of its 
phonological form, a mental schema of the order, the articulation and the stress 
pattern of how its vowels and consonants are to be uttered or written. That is 
why analogies are important to linguistic theorizing and modelling. Diagrams 
are important factors of language change, language evolution, and language 
acquisition, as the studies by Douglas Hofstadter (1995), Terrence Deacon 
(1997), Esa Itkonen (2005), Dieter Wanner (2006), Olga Fischer (2007), Win-
fried Nöth (2008) and others have shown, all of whom have given evidence that 
the basic mechanism of learning is analogy. 
5. Conclusion: Iconicity as a Precondition for 
Communication and Understanding 
Iconicity is then fundamental to communication and mutual understanding, in 
oral conversation as well as in writing and reading. It also plays an essential 
role in creative thought. It is the mental images, diagrams and metaphors trig-
gered by icons that enable us to understand an utterance or create textual 
worlds from the little black marks on the page. While texts consist of symbols, 
that is, letters and words, these symbols create mental images of relations, 
fictional worlds in which we can move and which we can see in our mind, by 
applying our own experiences and cognitive makeup to the text. This, in turn, 
shapes our individual fictional architecture, its furniture and its cartographic 
imagination in the reading process – and accounts for the creativity it involves. 
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Iconicity thus plays a paramount part in cognition and communication. Ob-
serving a picture, orienting oneself in a text or finding one’s way on a map are 
all complex creative cognitive activities involving modelling through dia-
grammatic reasoning, making use of analogy, similarity, and visuality in this 
process. 
6.  Discussion 
Barbara Tversky had two questions to my position statement: 
1) Peirce’s diagrammatic reasoning – is all reasoning actually diagrammatic 
and the only way in which we can get new insights? Does diagrammatic 
reasoning really apply to Perugino’s painting, which is so heavily loaded 
with religious symbols?  
2) David Woodward quote: Barbara did not agree with Woodward’s state-
ment that there must exist a “structural analogical relationship of a map 
to reality” – as an example, she suggested a cognitive map, which does 
not need this “structural analogical relationship”.  
To which I answered 
1) Diagrammatic reasoning, in the sense of C.S. Peirce (CP 2.272), is the 
only cognitive procedure that provides us with new knowledge. This is 
because a diagram only shows the relations existing between its constitu-
ents but it does not interpret them. Interpreting is reasoning. In the pro-
cess of interpreting the relations presented by a diagram, the interpreter 
can make diverse inferences by which the interpreter obtains insights that 
are not conveyed by the diagram itself. That is why reading a diagram 
can result in new insights that the diagram itself does not formulate. As I 
argued, even though the title of Perugino’s work clearly states the name 
of the two protagonists, a viewer unfamiliar with the cultural background 
could arrive at an understanding of the painting’s meaning by diagram-
matic reasoning only, without knowing the Bible narrative. The relation-
ship proposed between the gesture, the key and the temple door provides 
clues for solving the meaning of the picture. 
2) My point does not concern “cognitive maps” in the usual sense but geo-
graphical maps – a geographical map does not fulfill its function if it 
does not have a “structural analogical relationship” to reality, which is 
what it is made for, otherwise people could not use it for orientation. At 
the same time, all maps could be said to be cognitive as well as being 
“protocols of cognition” – they inform us about their own processes of 
creating meaning by their selection of and the relation in which they rep-
resent the objects in question. 
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